A sharp increase in the real interest rates in the U.S. in the l98Os was expected to induce a higher personal saving rate. Actually, between 1981 and 1983 the personal saving rate fell from 7.5 percent to 5.4 percent and for the 1985-1988 period it had averaged only 4 percent even though real interest rates have remained high. We argue that one possible explanation for this negative relation between interest rates and the personal saving rate is the large fraction of wealth, especially financial wealth, held by persons over 65 years old (this group has received more than 50 percent of all interest income in the U.S. during this period). Life cycle theory suggests, as we demonstrate, that the wealth effect created by an increase in the rate of interest reduces the savings of old persons and raises savings of the young and hence the effect on aggregate savings depends on the age distribution in the population.
Introduction
One of the puzzles in U.S. economic policy in the l98Os has been the behavior of the personal saving rate, that is of the share of after-tax personal income that individuals choose not to consume. When the Reagan Administration introduced a far-reaching and dramatic change in economic policy in 1981, which led to a sharp fall in the inflation rate and an equally sharp increase in real interest rates, it had been generally anticipated that those changes would induce individuals to increase their saving rate by substantial amounts. Some observers had in fact predicted that the increase in the rate of personal saving would be as high as 3 percentage points.
Actually, the expected increase in the impersonal saving rate did not occur.
On the contrary, between 1981 and 1983 the personal saving rate fell substantially (from 7.5 percent to 5.4 percent, respectively). Furthermore, the personal saving rate continued to fall and for the 1985-88 period it has averaged only about 4 percent even though real interest rates have remained high. In this paper we argue that one possible explanation for this negative relation between interest rates and the personal saving rate is the large fraction of wealth, and especially of financial wealth, held by persons over 65 years old. Economic theory suggests that while an increase in the rate of interest raises the savings of young, working persons, it typically reduces the savings of older and retired persons. It seems plausible that for the U.S. the latter effect could be a major explanation for the observed decrease in aggregate savings.
The relationship between saving and the rate of interest is one of the most important in economics. It is, for example, fundamental to the analysis role in the determination of saving in the classical, system, that role was downgraded to a definitely secondary one by the Keynesian revolution. In fact, in may textbook versions of the consumption function, the rate of interest did not even appear as a determinant of consumption. The recent popularity of so-called supply side economics has made the rate of interest important once more, and many of the policy decisions introduced in recent years in the United States and elsewhere have definitely been influenced by the belief that a change in the rate of interest can have significant effects on the propensity to save of individuals. However, in spite of the repeated statements made in recent years, that an increase in the real after-tax rate of return to saving would increase the rate of saving in the economy, the relationship between the rate of saving and the rate of return is not as straightforward as those statements imply. The usual assumption is that when the rate of return increases, there will be a tendency for people to save more as present consumption becomes more expensive than future consumption. This is the well-known substitution effect. On the other hand, it is generally recognized that a working individual may have some target amount of wealth that he wishes to accumulate by the time he retires, so that he can support his desired level of consumption through his retirement years. An increase in the rate of return to saving Out of current income implies that that target can be achieved with a lower current rate of saving. Therefore, the individual may react to the increase in the rate of return by saving less.
Theory tells us that a priori one cannot tell whether the substitution effect or the target effect will prevail. Empirical studies have done no better)'
There is one important element in these discussions that has generally been ignored. The theoretical discussions have implicitly emphasized the behavior of individuals in the preretirement age and the rate of return to "saving" rather than to "savings". However, an increase in the rate of return affects not just the return to current saving (that is, saving out of current income) but it affects also the return to all stock of existing financial wealth. In other words, it affects the return to the past accumulated savings held in interest-bearing forms.
There is considerable evidence that a large share of this financial wealth is in the hands of older, retired individuals who, as the life-cycle theory of consumer behavior tells us, have a much higher propensity to consume out of additional income than younger individuals in their active age. In fact, this theory tells us that the older is an individual the higher will be his/her propensity to consume, ceteris paribus. A change in the real rate of return to financial assets will disproportionately increase the income of those very people who are likely to spend more. Once this consideration is taken into account, it becomes obvious that the relative strength of the income and the substitution effect depends on the age distribution of the population as well as on the distribution of financial assets by age group.2 About 11 percent of the U.S. population is in the 65 and over age bracket with an average age of around 74 years. These are individuals who have an average life expectancy of somewhere around 10 years and who can be expected to have a very high marginal propensity to consume. Therefore, an increase in interest rates that resulted in higher incomes to those older individuals could substantially increase their consumption, which in turn could easily neutralize or even overwhelm whatever increase in saving might come from those in the preretirement age. neutralize or even overwhelm whatever increase in saving might come from those in the preretiremeflt age.
In SectiOn 2 we provide the evidence of the decrease in savings in the U.S. during the 1981-1988 period. Section 3 evaluates the role of wealth and income held by the elderly. Section 4 presents a simple ].ifecycle model that exhibits the opposite effects that an increase in the rate of interest has on young and old persons. Assuming a steady population growth rate, some calculations demonstrate the possibility of a negative response of aggregate savings to an increase in the real rate of interest. The detailed model and some comparative statistics are given in the Appendix.
The Savings Rate in the 1981-1988 Period
In 1981 the Reagan administration introduced some major policy changes that were expected to increase aggregate savings. The elements that would induce the higher saving rate were several: first, there were the substantial cuts in marginal tax rates for all taxpayers brought about by the 1981 KempRoth tax-cut legislation; these cuts would be spread over a three-year period.
Second, there was the immediate reduction in the marginal tax rate on unearned incomes from 70 to 50 percent. Third, there were the additional savings incentives (IRAs, etc.) also introduced by the 1981 tax package. All of these guaranteed that the rewards to saving would increase for any given real rate of interest. However, these rewards were raised even more dramatically when the sharp fall in the inflation rate was accompanied by an equally sharp increase in real interest rates. For a variety of reasons on which economists are not in complete agreement (energy crisis, Mundell-Tobin effect, OPEC surpluses, etc.), the generally increasing inflation rate from the early to a reversal of this behavior had taken place and real rates became sharply positive. Furthermore, the fiscal deficit also increased sharply after 1981.
According to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, as reformulated by Barro, private saving should also have risen because of this.
Did this unusually propitious combination of circumstances lead, as expected, to a sharply rising personal saving rate? The measurement of the saving rate is fraught with difficulties; however, the official statistics prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce and reported in Table 1 indicate that the expected increase in the saving rate did not occur. On the contrary, the share of personal saving in disposable (i.e., after-tax) personal income fell from 7.5 percent in 1981 to as low as 3.2 percent in 1987 which was the lowest saving rate for the whole 1970-88 period shown in the table. The saving rates in the table are shown also in Figure 1 .
A slightly different picture is obtained if one adds undistributed corporate profits to personal saving (see Table 1 and Figure 1) . A justification for doing this would be that individuals do not distinguish between their own saving and that of the enterprises in which they own shares.
As a consequence, saving by the latter, in the form of undistributed corporate profits, replaces the individuals' own saving. Net private saving is the summation of personal saving and undistributed corporate profits. The last column of Table 1 gives net private saving as a percentage of disposable personal income. The yearly data show that net private saving as a share of disposable income was around 11 percent in the 1976-78 period. It fell afterward and it was relatively low for the 1982-83 period. It increased again to almost 10 percent in 1984 but it fell to around 6 percent by 1987-88. Thus, the basic conclusion that one gets from the available official statistics is that the saving rate fell in the post-1981 period in spite of the sharp increase in the real rate of return. This is not what one would have expected from economic theory. Thus, the behavior of the saving rate constitutes a puzzle.
3.
Income and Wealth of the Elderly
What do we know about the financial assets of older individuals relative to the rest of the population? Not as much as we would like but what we do know clearly supports the contention that this group shares disproportionately in any benefits associated with increasing rates of returns to financial assets. For example, it will certainly come as a surprise to many that in 1985, the latest year for which this information is available, taxpayers aged 65 and over received almost 53 percent of all interest income reported to the Internal Revenue Service (see Table 2 of those who held long-term financial assets and these losses may have reduced or eliminated the gains associated with higher real rates. However, the sharp fall in nominal rates between 1981 and 1983 gave those holding long-term financial assets considerable capital gains that were additional to the gains associated with high real rates. In other words, the capital gains reinforced the effect associated with higher real rates at least in the earlier years of the 1980s. The net result is that the resources available to older individuals, who more than other groups hold financial assets, increased sharply and so did their consumption.
This may explain the saving puzzle. In more recent years real interest rates have fallen below the levels of the early l980s but they have remained very high compared to earlier periods.
Furthermore, the proportion of the elderly in the total population has been rising.
We shall now demonstrate that this explanation of the observed negative relation between aggregate savings and the real interest rate can be supported by means of a simple lifecycle model of individual behavior.
The Interest-Rate in Lifecycle and in Agzre2ate Savings
Consider an individual who chooses his optimum path of consumption and labor supply so as to maximize his/her lifetime utility over a finite horizon.
The rate of interest is assumed to be fixed and, for simplicity, the wage rate is invariant with age. Assume further that there is no initial endowment and no bequest of capital.
It is shown in the Appendix that for a logarithmic instantaneous utility function, the optimum consumption function, c, and capital accumulation, k, and labor supply, l, derived explicitly: Given 4 and l we can calculate the optimum income path, 4: 
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From (1) < T. To see that the sign of (A.6) is positive, note that the positive, while the last term in brackets is -o at t-T, strictly t and hence negative for 0 < t < T. in the text: For example, while an often cited and influential study by Boskin (1978) had found a substantive sensitivity of saving to the rate of return, a study by Fre.nd and Hasbrouck (1983) found no relationship.
2. The life-cycle theory of consumer behavior has been questioned in some recent empirical studies. Some cross-secttional data show that the wealth of indviduals increases with age. However, Berrtheim (1987) and Hurd (1987) using panel data have demonstrated that the propensity to consume rises with age and that the elderly do dissave during retirement. 
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